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Unconscious deception detection
measured by finger skin temperature
and indirect veracity judgments—
results of a registered report
Anna E. van ’t Veer 1*, Marcello Gallucci 2, Mariëlle Stel 1 and Ilja van Beest 1
1 Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg,
Netherlands, 2 Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy
A pre-registered experiment was conducted to examine psychophysiological responses
to being lied to. Bridging research on social cognition and deception detection,
we hypothesized that observing a liar compared to a truth-teller would decrease
finger skin temperature of observers. Participants first watched two targets while not
forewarned that they would later be asked to judge (direct and indirect) veracity, and
then watched another two targets while forewarned about this. During both these
phases finger skin temperature was measured. Findings pertaining to temperature partly
confirmed our main hypothesis. When participants were observing a liar, irrespective
of being forewarned, on average finger skin temperature declined over time. In the
forewarned phase, temperature trajectories of truth-tellers were higher than those
of liars, however, in the not forewarned phase, this pattern was reversed. Results
confirmed our further hypotheses that participants judge liars as less likeable and
less trustworthy than truth-tellers—an indication of indirect deception detection. Our
hypothesis that the effect size for trustworthiness would be bigger than that of liking was
not supported by the data. Additionally, and also confirming our hypothesis, participants
performed around chance level when directly judging whether the target person was
lying. Exploratory analyses are reported with regard to truth bias and dependency
between direct and indirect veracity judgments. Limitations and directions for future work
related to the existence of psychophysiological indicators of deception detection are
discussed.
Keywords: deception detection, physiological markers, skin temperature, indirect deception detection,
interpersonal relations, psychophysiology
Results of a Registered Report
The current paper reports the results of research that was conducted after its pre-registration went
through peer review and was awarded In Principle Acceptance. A methods paper holding the pre-
registration of the current research (hereafter referred to as the registered report, RR), including the
hypotheses, analysis plan, and proposed sample, as well as a pilot study, can be found online in this
special issue (see van ’t Veer et al., 2014). Below we briefly summarize the theoretical background
and our hypotheses.
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Brief Summary of Theoretical Background
Being able to detect deception of others—or at the very least
knowing whom to trust—was most likely an indispensable
advantage during human evolution. Indeed, there are many
indications that judging (moral) character and forming
impressions of the intentions of others is an elementary,
innate ability (e.g., Willis and Todorov, 2006; Fiske et al., 2007;
Miller, 2007). Nevertheless, a robust finding in the deception
detection literature indicates that people are no better than
chance at detecting a liar (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). This is the
case, at least, when deception detection ability is assessed with
veracity judgments that directly ask about the untruthfulness of
a statement. At the same time, an increasing amount of evidence
is emerging from the deception detection literature that suggests
that people’s judgments of liars and truth-tellers do sometimes
differentiate between the two—especially when these judgments
are assessed in an indirect way.
Evidence for these seemingly more accurate intuitions about
the dishonesty of others comes from studies that find indirect
veracity judgments (i.e., judgments not explicitly aimed at
decidingwhether deception took place) differentiate between liars
and truth-tellers better than direct veracity judgments (Vrij et al.,
2001; Ulatowska, 2010, 2014). Meta-analyses report that people
have more confidence in their judgments after seeing a truth-
teller (DePaulo et al., 1997), supporting the idea that feelings of
confidence—as indirect measures of deception detection—might
differentiate truths from lies. Moreover, subjective, quick, and
automatic judgments all seem to be better at distinguishing liars
from truth-tellers than their objective, slow, and deliberative
counterparts (DePaulo et al., 2003; Albrechtsen et al., 2009).
We suggest that the above-mentioned work can be
complimented by not only measuring indirect and direct veracity
judgments, but also by exploring the possibility of a physiological
marker (i.e., an unconscious indicator) of this indirect deception
detection. Building on classical (Harlow, 1958; Bowlby, 1969)
as well as more recent work (IJzerman and Koole, 2011; Kang
et al., 2011; Szymkow et al., 2013) that relates temperature to trust
and perceptions of trustworthiness, we sought to test whether
picking up on the deception of others might reflect itself in skin
temperature. In the current research, we measure finger skin
temperature of people who observe both liars and truth-tellers, as
we believe that this physiological proxy of social interaction could
be an important indicator of people’s correct intuition toward
liars. Previous findings indicate an association between negative
or stressful experiences and the lowering of skin temperature
(Boudewyns, 1976; Rimm-Kaufman and Kagan, 1996; Kistler
et al., 1998; Zhong and Leonardelli, 2008; IJzerman et al., 2012).
Therefore, the central hypothesis that we aim to test is whether
finger skin temperature will decrease over time when observing
a liar compared to when observing a truth-teller.
Pre-Registered Hypotheses
There were several hypotheses put forward in the pre-registration.
To facilitate and clarify the distinction between our confirmatory
and exploratory analyses, we restate the hypotheses here. Our
main hypothesis was that finger skin temperature would decrease
during the watching of a 3-min video clip of a liar (H1). We
further hypothesized that participants would judge truth-tellers
more trustworthy and likeable than liars (the indirect veracity
judgments; H2a), with the additional hypothesis that this effect
would be bigger for the trustworthiness judgment than for the
liking judgment, because trustworthiness judgments are suggested
to be more automatic and intuitive and would therefore tap
into the covert differences between liars and truth-tellers better
(H2b). Next to this, we hypothesized that when asked to judge
whether a target person is lying, participants’ judgment would
not differentiate between liars and truth-tellers better than chance
(the direct veracity judgment; H3). Finally, we hypothesized
that the indirect veracity judgments, namely the liking and
trustworthiness for the target person, would be positively related
to finger skin temperature, whereas the direct veracity judgment
would not be (H4).
We also included two distinct phases in our experiment.
First, participants were not forewarned they might be lied to,
and subsequently, they were forewarned of this possibility. This
allowed us to explore whether the hypothesized effects interact
with the level of suspicion participants may have. People have
their own ideas about what a liar could look like, yet these
beliefs about cues are often incorrect (Vrij and Semin, 1996).
Having a goal to detect deception could therefore arguably make
participants look for these cues more. Additionally, looking for
specific cues (e.g., cues that indicate untrustworthiness) may
prompt participants to process information more systematically.
On the one hand, it could be expected that increased suspicion
in the forewarned phase may result in an overall tendency to
trust less, without making veracity judgments more accurate
(De Neys et al., 2013). On the other hand, being forewarned
could benefit the impressions that are formed of targets. Signs of
untrustworthiness may more readily be perceived as such due to
high accessibility. We therefore tested whether skin temperature,
as well as both the direct and the indirect veracity judgment, were
differently affected in these two phases.
Exploratory Research Questions
In addition to the pre-registered hypotheses and exploratory
examination mentioned above, we explored our data on the basis
of two considerations that occurred after the results were in.
First of all, we tested whether on the direct veracity judgment
participants were better than chance at detecting deception
while controlling for the indirect judgments. We did this to
understand the interdependence of the direct and indirect veracity
judgments: Although trustworthiness and likeability judgments
were counterbalanced, the direct veracity judgment always came
after these two indirect judgments. Secondly, we also explored
whether participants’ tendency to judge a target as a truth-teller
(truth bias) was lower in the forewarned phase than in the not
forewarned phase. Truth bias has been argued to be especially
prominent during automatic compared to systematic processing
(Masip et al., 2009). Therefore, if truth bias were lessened in
the forewarned phase this could be an indication, although not
conclusively so, of more systematic processing.
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Materials and Methods
Participants
In accordance1 with the RR, data was collected over a period
of 3 weeks. Participants received either course credit or €8. This
resulted in a total N of 191, exceeding our minimal planned
sample size of 120 due to running full weeks. We excluded 36
(18.85%) of the participants on the basis of one or more of our
predefined exclusion criteria; two participants for knowing that
the experiment was about measuring temperature, 28 for being
acquainted with one or more of the target people on the videos,
10 for technical failure of the temperature measurement, and
one person for smoking more than 20 cigarettes a day. We did
not disregard any data points on the basis of our predefined
temperature cut-off: participants’ finger skin temperature did not
fall below 18° C or above 37° C. Our final sample therefore
consisted of 155 participants, 60.65% female, Mage = 21.35,
SDage = 3.78, age range: 18–53 years. Participants completed
an hour of experiments of which this study was the last
half hour, allowing skin temperature to reach a stable level
before the experiment began. We did not deviate from the
registered minimum sample size, data exclusions, manipulations,
or measures in the study except for one instance that we outline in
footnote 4.
Design and Procedure
Participants’ finger skin temperature was measured with an
iButton (see Pouw et al., 2012, for software instructions) during
the entire experiment. The first experimental factor, veracity of
the target person, wasmanipulated by showing participants a total
of four videos containing either a truth-teller or a liar. The second
experimental factor, being forewarned or not, was manipulated
by not informing participants that the goal of watching the videos
was to detect deception for the first two videos (not forewarned
phase). For the last two videos, participants were informed of this
(forewarned phase)2.
All participants first watched a nature documentary of 8 min,
which allowed the iButton to reach a stable finger temperature.
Participants then watched two videos of 3 min that randomly
contained a target person being truthful or untruthful about their
identity (not forewarned phase). Next, participants completed our
three main dependent variables: for the first and second target
person separately, participants were asked to indicate how much
they liked this person and how trustworthy they thought this
person was (the indirect veracity judgments; both on 7-point
scales, order counterbalanced between participants), followed by
whether they thought the target person was telling the truth (the
direct veracity judgment; forced choice between yes or no).
We refer to the next phase as the forewarned phase. Due to
completing the three main dependent variables participants were
now warned about the type of questions they would be asked.
From these questions, in turn, they could infer that there was a
possibility that the target personwould lie.We further stressed the
purpose of watching the next videos by telling participants they
1For a description of adequate detail to allow close replication we refer to the
pre-registration of this experiment (van ’t Veer et al., 2014).
2In the RR these two phases were termed “unaware” and “aware.”
would get the same questions for these videos. Additionally, all
three questions were repeated to help remind them. Participants
then proceeded to watch the last two videos that randomly
contained a truth-teller or a liar, and completed the three main
dependent variables for this third and fourth target person. At the
end of the experiment, participants indicated their age, gender,
smoking behavior, acquaintance with any of the people presented
in the videos, dominant hand, and their thoughts on what the
experiment was about.
Results
All data pre-processing steps (as described in the RR) are available
from the first author on request. De-identified data, syntax,
R scripts and supplemental material are available online (see
https://osf.io/j8w4i/).
Confirmatory Analyses
Temperature Trajectories
The first hypothesis stated that finger skin temperature would
decrease while observing a liar (H1). Figure 1 shows the average
temperature trajectories over time for both the not forewarned
and forewarnedphase. To test the first hypothesis, amodelwas run
inwhich all factorsweremodeled as both fixed and randomeffects
in order to estimate the main effect of veracity, the main effect of
gender, the main effect of being forewarned, the main effect of
order, their interactions, and the interaction of the experimental
factors with time. As described in the RR, the interaction of
the experimental factors veracity, being forewarned and time
informs on whether temperature trajectories change depending
on the target person’s veracity and on whether participants were
forewarned of the fact that this is a situation in which they
have to detect deception. Therefore, the most important effect of
the complete model is the interaction effect of the experimental
factors and their interaction with time, because the expected
change in temperature due to the experimental factors should
unfold over time3.
There was a main effect of time [b = 0.0006,
F(1,153.026) = 5.251, p = 0.023] and a quadratic effect of
time [b= 0.000007, F(1,154.432)= 46.779, p< 0.001], indicating
that participants’ finger skin temperature dropped during a video
and climbed a little toward the end of the video. To grasp the
meaning of the size of these effects of time, one could consider that
on average our participants’ finger skin temperature was getting
one tenth of a degree colder in 3 min. There was also a main
effect of gender [b =  0.146, F(1,154.140) = 6.829, p = 0.010]
indicating females were relatively colder than males, but there
was no interaction of gender with the other experimental factors
(all ps > 0.341). Neither veracity nor being forewarned had a
3As planned, we computed participants’ temperature minus their temperature
at the beginning of the video, and because we should allow some time for any
influence of our manipulations to take effect, we centered time on the last
second of the video. This deviates from our original plan to center time on
85 s, however it does not influence the interactions between time, veracity,
and being forewarned that are of interest. This will produce an estimate (b) of
the influence of observing a truth-teller or a liar for approximately 3 min on
participants’ finger skin temperature.
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FIGURE 1 | Average observed temperature change (with confidence interval) over time as a function of veracity of the target person (truth or lie),
broken down by phase: While not forewarned of the possibility of deception (left) and while forewarned of the possibility of deception (right).
main effect (ps 0.866 and 0.509, respectively), and time did not
interact significantly with veracity or being forewarned (p= 0.598
and 0.122, respectively). The order of seeing a truth-teller or a
liar first did not have an effect on participants’ temperature, nor
did the order of judging trustworthiness or liking first (p = 0.800
and p = 0.848, respectively). Neither of these orders interacted
with veracity or being forewarned (p = 0.626 and p = 0.494,
respectively).4,5,6
4In the RR we stated that participants who had “prior experience with the
temperature measure (and its debriefing) will be offered participation in
another study and will be refused participation in the current study on
theoretical grounds, as people may be able to consciously control their own
finger temperature (Keefe, 1978).” Two participants did participate but stated
in their comments they were aware that temperature was measured, and
thus we saw fit to exclude them. Not excluding these two participants does
not change the overall results: The interaction between veracity and being
forewarned is still marginally significant, b =  0.173, F(1,155.599) = 3.758,
p = 0.054 and so is the interaction between veracity, being forewarned, and
time, b= 0.001, F(1,156.000)= 3.780, p= 0.054.
5We excluded one participant who indicated to smoke more than 20
cigarettes a day (as our pre-defined exclusion criteria required). Including
this participant did not change any of the interpretations of the results,
both the interaction between veracity and being forewarned and the
interaction between veracity, being forewarned, and time were marginally
significant [b =  0.166, F(1,154.453) = 3.552, p = 0.061, and b < 0.001,
F(1,155.000)= 3.655, p= 0.058, respectively].
6As was specified in the RR, we also ran our full model while excluding
participants who did not reach 30° C during the neutral naturemovie. This left
a total of 108 participants (about two thirds of our total sample;Mage = 21.49,
SDage = 4.25, 53.70% female). Excluding these participants did not change the
Importantly, there was a marginally significant three-way
interaction between veracity, being forewarned, and time,
b =  0.001, F(1,154.001) = 3.598, p = 0.060, and, also a
marginally significant interaction between veracity and being
forewarned, b =  0.165, F(1,153.534) = 3.461, p = 0.065
(see Figure 1). Together, these interactions suggests that when
participants were not forewarned, their finger skin temperature
lowered more when they were watching a truth-teller compared
to when they were watching a liar. Yet when participants were
forewarned, their finger skin temperature lowered more when
they were watching a liar compared to when they were watching
a truth-teller. At the end of the videos, for not forewarned
participants, watching a truth-teller meant a finger temperature
0.101° C colder than when watching a liar, whereas when
participants were forewarned, watching a truth-teller meant
a finger temperature 0.077° C warmer than when watching
a liar. In other words, when watching truth-tellers, without
consciously knowing what they were looking for, our participants’
temperature loweredmore than when participants did know what
they were looking for.When watching liars, however, temperature
lowered no matter whether participants were forewarned or not.
From the marginally significant three-way interaction, we
can tentatively conclude that our prediction that finger skin
temperature would decrease while participants watch a liar (H1)
is supported by the data. However, only for the phase in which
estimate of the veracity  being forewarned interaction, however, the effect
did become non-significant: b= 0.168, F(1,107.780)= 2.259, p= 0.136.
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FIGURE 2 | Means and standard errors of the indirect veracity judgments (trustworthiness and liking) of the target person, for truth-tellers and liars,
by phase (not forewarned and forewarned).
participants were forewarned that they could be lied to was
this decrease more pronounced than the decrease we observed
when participants were watching truth-tellers. Moreover, there
was significant variation at the participant level, meaning that the
effect of observing a liar or a truth-teller on skin temperature
varied from one participant to another. We should therefore
not exclude the possibility that there is an unknown individual
difference characteristic that moderates the relationship between
veracity and skin temperature (cf., Whitsett and Shoda, 2014).
Indirect Veracity Judgments
Figure 2 depicts the means and standard errors of the indirect
veracity judgments (trustworthiness and liking). We ran two
separate models to test Hypothesis 2a; the first to assess whether
liars were liked less than truth-tellers, the second to assess whether
liars were rated lower on trustworthiness than truth-tellers.
The first linear mixed model with liking as the dependent
variable and veracity, being forewarned, and order as
predictors revealed a main effect of veracity, b =  0.364,
F(1,461.532) = 13.735, p < 0.001, meaning that on average
liars were liked less (M = 4.706, SE = 0.79) than truth-tellers
(M = 5.071, SE = 0.79). There was also a main effect of being
forewarned, b =  0.247, F(1,462.203) = 6.287, p = 0.013,
meaning that when participants were forewarned, they judged
the target person less likeable. There was no interaction between
veracity and being forewarned (p = 0.109), and no effect of order
of seeing a truth-teller or a liar first (p = 0.717). The order of
first judging liking of the target person and then judging the
trustworthiness of the target person, or visa versa, did have an
effect, b =  0.307, F(1,153.792) = 6.012, p = 0.015, such that if
a participant first judged liking, their liking judgment was higher
than if a participant first judged trustworthiness and then liking.
Regarding the random intercepts, we found a non-zero variance
(s= 0.226,Wald Z= 3.102, p= 0.002), implying that participants
have different average liking ratings.
The second linear mixed model with trustworthiness as the
dependent variable and veracity, being forewarned, and order
as predictors revealed an average effect of veracity, b =  0.348,
F(1,461.656) = 11.843, p < 0.001, meaning that on average liars
were deemed less trustworthy (M= 4.616, SE= 0.079) than truth-
tellers (M = 4.965, SE = 0.079). There was also a main effect of
being forewarned, b= 0.347, F(1,462.340)= 11.742, p< 0.001,
meaning that when participants were forewarned, they judged the
target person less trustworthy. There was a marginally significant
interaction between veracity and being forewarned, b =  0.335,
F(1,461.656) = 2.746, p = 0.098, suggesting that the difference
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on the trustworthiness judgment between liars and truth-tellers
became bigger in the forewarned phase. Both the order of seeing
a truth-teller or a liar first and the order of the indirect veracity
judgments were not significant predictors in thismodel (p= 0.783
and 0.217 respectively). Regarding the random intercepts, we
found a non-zero variance (s= 0.180,Wald Z= 2.546, p= 0.011).
Taken together, the results of the indirect veracity judgments
suggest that liars were liked and trusted less than truth-tellers. It
also seems to be the case that being forewarned of the possibility of
deceit made participants more distrusting overall, and especially
so for liars. This indicates that if participants are alerted to the fact
that they can be deceived, this helps them form better impressions
of the target person’s sincerity.
Hypothesis H2b stated that the effect of rating truth-tellers
more positive than liars on the indirect veracity measures would
be bigger for trustworthiness, as trustworthiness judgments are
suggested to be automatic and intuitive and could therefore better
distinguish the subtle differences between truth-tellers and liars.
We testedwhether the effect size of veracity on the trustworthiness
judgment was higher than the effect size of veracity on the liking
judgment. To obtain this test we estimated a mixed model with
both trust and liking judgments combined as a single dependent
variable, veracity as independent variable, and with appropriate
dummies indicating whether the scores refer to trustworthiness or
liking. The interaction between the veracity term and the dummy
provides the required test. This technique, one of the different
ways to estimate a seemingly unrelated equation model, is largely
inspired by random coefficients mediational models (MacCallum
et al., 1997; Bauer et al., 2006). We found no difference between
effect sizes, coefficients difference = 0.019, t(1073.8) = 0.130,
p= 0.896.7
Direct Veracity Judgment
We estimated a mixed logistic model with participants’ accuracy
on the direct veracity judgment (“Is this person telling the
truth, yes or no?”), with veracity, being forewarned, and order
as predictors. Because the mixed model did not converge, the
logistic regression parameters and the associated inferential tests
were obtained with GEE methodology (Zeger et al., 1988). An
exchangeable working correlation matrix was used to model the
dependency of observations. Results showed a main effect of
veracity, $2(1) = 99.375, p < 0.001, such that the probability of a
correct response was higher when participants had been watching
a truth-teller compared to a liar. There was nomain effect of being
forewarned $2(1) = 1.211, p = 0.270, and being forewarned and
veracity did not interact, $2(1) = 0.40, p = 0.841. There was no
effect of order (p= 0.998).
These results indicate that although participants were more
accurate in detecting truth-tellers—a finding probably due
to truth-bias (see also under exploratory analyses)—being
forewarned or not did not significantly affect the ability to
correctly detect liars and truth-tellers. Despite of this, there is
value in examiningwhether for the different phases the probability
7We also explored the relationship between liking and trustworthiness
judgments by using amixedmodel with random intercepts after standardizing
these variables, and found that liking and trustworthiness judgments were
highly correlated (0.670).
of correctly detecting deception is higher than chance (H3).
To test the accuracy of participants direct veracity judgments
against chance in the two phases, we ran the same model
as described above, with now only being forewarned as the
independent variable. In the not forewarned phase, participants
were correct 52.92% of the time, which did not differ from chance,
$2(1) = 0.725, p = 0.395, Wald 95% CI [0.47, 0.58]. In the
forewarned phase, participants were correct 57.42% of the time,
which was significantly different from chance, $2(1) = 9.704,
p = 0.002, Wald 95% CI [0.53, 0.63]. We further examined
whether this higher accuracy rate in the forewarned phase could
be explained by the indirect veracity judgments that were assessed
right before it. We did this because the results also indicated that
the indirect veracity judgmentswere affected by being forewarned.
We report on this analysis under exploratory analyses.
Relationship between Temperature and the Veracity
Judgments
To assess whether participants’ temperature at the end of the
videos is predictive of their indirect and direct veracity judgments
we ran separate models with temperature as the independent and
liking, trustworthiness, accuracy of participants answer on the
direct veracity judgment, and the answer of the direct veracity
judgment as dependent variables. We did not find a relationship
between temperature and any of these self-report measures.
Temperature was not predictive of liking, F(1,610.689) = 1.661,
p = 0.198, and it did not interact with the experimental factors
to predict liking, all ps > 0.137. Temperature was also not
predictive of the trustworthiness judgment, F(1,609.964)= 2.358,
p = 0.125. The interaction of being forewarned and temperature
on trustworthiness was marginally significant (p = 0.085),
however, interactions of veracity with temperature as well as the
interaction of veracity with being forewarned and temperature
were not significant (all ps > 0.633). For the direct veracity
judgment, temperature did not predict whether the direct veracity
judgment was correct, $2(1)= 0.009, p= 0.923, nor did it predict
whether participants said yes or no to the question whether the
target person was telling the truth, $2(1)= 0.757, p= 0.384.
Exploratory Analyses
Detection Accuracy When Controlling for Indirect
Judgments
As is described above, we found participants’ accuracy in
detecting deception in the forewarned phase to be significantly
higher than can be expected by chance. We also found an effect of
being forewarned on the trustworthiness judgment, such that in
the forewarned phase, participants were more likely to judge a liar
as less trustworthy. It could be the case, therefore, that because
the indirect veracity judgments (i.e., liking and trustworthiness)
were judged before the direct veracity judgment, participants
accuracy on the direct veracity judgments was enhanced due to
an enhanced performance on the indirect measures. To examine
this possibility, we ran the model assessing whether accuracy
at detecting deception was better than chance again, this time
controlling for the indirect veracity judgments. Comparable
as to when not controlling for these judgments, participants’
deception detection accuracy was not significantly different from
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chance in the not forewarned phase $2(1) = 0.576, p = 0.448,
Wald 95% CI [0.34, 0.71]. However, as a result of controlling
for these judgments, in the forewarned phase, participants’
accuracy was no longer significantly different from chance either,
$2(1) = 1.982, p = 0.159, Wald 95% CI [0.39, 0.75]. This could
imply a reliance of the direct veracity judgment on the indirect
measures, although we are hesitant to make any firm conclusions
on the basis of these results.
Truth Bias
The finding that in the forewarned phase participants seemed to
be better able to distinguish between liars and truth-tellers on both
the indirect as well as the direct veracity judgment could be a
side effect of an overall change in the tendency to judge messages
as true. Our manipulation of being forewarned could have made
participantsmore suspicious overall, leading them to judge a lower
proportion of messages as truths. To test whether this was the
case, we ran a GEE with the tendency to judge a message as
the truth as the dependent variable and being forewarned and
veracity as the independent variables. Although the tendency
to make truth judgments was higher when actually watching a
truth-teller compared to a liar, $2(1) = 7.962, p < 0.01, the
tendency to make truth judgments did not differ between the
different phases, $2(1) = 0.612, p = 0.434. Participants thus did
not differ in their amount of truth judgments when watching
truths in the not forewarned phase (proportion = 0.733) and the
forewarned phase (proportion = 0.781), and they did not differ
in their amount of truth judgments when watching lies in the not
forewarned phase (proportion= 0.675) and the forewarned phase
(proportion= 0.632).
Discussion
With this registered study we explored people’s automatic
evaluative and physiological responses to observing a deceiver, as
well as their more conscious direct evaluation of a target person’s
veracity. We did so in two distinct phases: First while participants
were not forewarned of what the goal of observing another person
was, and second while participants were forewarned that the
goal was to form an impression of this other person’s likeability,
trustworthiness, and their veracity. We chose to measure
participants’ finger skin temperature because of the suggested
embodied function of warmth in interpersonal relationships.
The observed patterns of temperature change over time only
partly confirmed our main hypothesis (H1), and the current
findings pertaining to this hypothesis are therefore inconclusive.
We found that finger skin temperature consistently decreased
while observing a liar. When participants were observing a truth-
teller, however, their finger skin temperature decreased more
than it did for liars in the phase where participants did not
have the goal to detect deception. In contrast, participant’s finger
skin temperature stayed higher when observing a truth-teller
compared to a liar when participants did have the goal to detect
deception. This latter pattern is consistent with the direction
of our predictions based on the relationship between warmth
and positive person impressions; however, it failed to achieve
significance by conventional standards.
As for the judgments of trustworthiness and likeability—the
so-called indirect veracity judgments—we found that across
both phases, liars were consistently judged less trustworthy
and less likeable than truth-tellers. This is in accordance with
our hypothesis (H2a) which was based on earlier findings in
the literature indicating that subjective, indirect, and intuitive
judgments can contrast liars from truth-tellers (Vrij et al., 2001;
DePaulo et al., 2003; Albrechtsen et al., 2009) and this finding
replicates our earlier findings of the pilot study described in
the RR (see van ’t Veer et al., 2014) associated with the current
study. In addition, results indicated that in the forewarned phase
participants were more inhibited in their liking and trusting
overall. Irrespective of this, trustworthiness and liking judgments
were lower for liars than for truth-tellers in both phases. It thus
seems that intuitive judgments are reliable guides when forming
impressions of the intentions of others no matter whether people
are forewarned or not.
We did not observe a difference between the magnitude of the
effect of the likeability judgment and the trustworthiness
judgment. This fails to support our hypothesis that
trustworthiness judgments would differentiate between liars
and truth-tellers better than likeability judgments because
of the relative automaticity that has been argued to underlie
trustworthiness impression formation (H2b). In the current
study the order of these two indirect veracity judgments was
counterbalanced. For the likeability judgment we found the order
of the questions to influence the judgments themselves: The target
person was judged less likeable if trustworthiness was assessed
first. These judgments were also highly correlated, suggesting
that we cannot draw far-reaching conclusions from the fact that
we found similar magnitudes of effects. Future research may
test the difference in strength of these judgments in a between
participants design rather than a within design.
For people’s ability to accurately indicate whether someone
was lying, we predicted that this direct veracity judgment would
not detect deception much better than chance (H3), as a meta-
analysis by Bond and DePaulo (2006) would suggest. We indeed
found participants to be accurate about 53% of the time in
the not forewarned phase, a performance that was not different
from chance. However, when participants were alerted to the
possibility of deceit and had the goal to detect deception, their
accuracy rose to 57%. This percentage was significantly different
from chance, although not as substantial as to suggest our
participants were able to catch liars with a high success rate. It
seems that, at least in the case where participants are searching
for indications of ill intend, they had a slightly higher chance
of correctly detecting a liar. This can be the case, for instance,
because of a reduced truth-bias under conditionswhere people are
more suspicious, or, as our exploratory analyses suggest, because
intuitive impressions of others are aided by being a bit more on
guard. A combination of these two processes could also be at play:
Adjustment of the automatic tendency to judge most people to
be evidently honest for the perception of ill-intent could require
motivational resources (i.e., the goal to detect deception) as well as
indications from indirectly formed impressions. Future research
could examine whether it best to be on guard while relying on
intuition at the same time. We suggest that it is likely that this is
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what happens when affective judgments are made in a context in
which deception is more salient.
Taken together, our participants’ accuracy in correctly
indicating whether they were being lied to was around chance
level, and their impressions of liars’ likeability and trustworthiness
were likely to be more negative than their impressions of truth-
tellers. Although comparing participants’ accuracy on the direct
judgment to the indirect judgments is not a fair comparison in
this case, in the pilot study we described in the RR, we assessed
both types of judgments on a continuous scale, allowing for
a better comparison. Results of the pilot study indicated very
clearly that participants did not explicitly judge liars to be more
deceptive than truth-tellers. In contrast to this, the indirect
judgment that assessed to what extent a target person was likeable
was significantly lower for liars compared to truth-tellers. Similar
evidence for the superior accuracy of indirect questions has been
found by others, for instance when using the question how hard a
target person was thinking compared to the question whether the
target person was lying (Ulatowska, 2014). Our results further
imply that one and the same person is judged more negatively
when he or she is lying compared to when telling the truth, even
though this person has a good chance of ostensibly getting away
with giving off a false impression.
With regard to the relationship between our self-report
measures and skin temperature (H4), we found no meaningful
correlations. This can be contrasted with the results of the pilot
study, where we did observe a positive correlation between (a)
temperature and liking the target person and (b) temperature
and judging the target person to be telling the truth. This
discrepancy calls for further exploration of the functioning of
thermoregulation in response to real life social interactions and
the possible interplay of physiological and psychological processes
during deception detection.
As our main findings pertaining to the temperature measure
reached marginal significance, we are hesitant to draw firm
conclusions, and suggest future explorations in this area to
consider an even bigger sample size. Currently, we found an initial
tentative trace of the supposition that observing a deceiver can
influence the physiology of the observer. More specifically, our
findings hint at a thermoregulatory mechanism that responds to
the veracity of an impression another person is trying to convey.
Being Forewarned of The Possibility of Deceit
There are several possible explanations for why being forewarned
or not would lead to different processes and outcomes. Below
we discuss these explanations and relate them to our findings
for the direct and indirect veracity judgments, the physiological
changes and our previous findings in the pilot study described in
the RR. Our data suggest liars have more chance of getting caught
when their observer is alerted to the possibility of deceit. This
indicates that detection—and possibly the ability to process the
rich variety of information that is sent by the target person—is
aided by having a detection goal while decoding a message. It
has been previously argued that having correct beliefs about
what cues give a liar away benefits the observer only when such
beliefs are activated while making the judgment: People have
been found to be better at detecting a liar when they are both told
a target is “usually untruthful” (thus creating suspicion) and rely
on accurate non-verbal cues to deception (Forrest et al., 2004).
A possible explanation thus seems to be that some level of active
engagement in detection is beneficial because distinct processes
are switched on.
Our indirect measures seemed to be slightly more powerful
in differentiating liars from truth-tellers when participants were
forewarned. One possible explanation that has been provided
for the finding that indirect questions are more accurate than
direct questions is that the indirect questions shift participants’
attention to the appropriate cues to deception (Vrij et al., 2001).
However, this explanation does not seem to account for sharpened
differentiationwhen the aim to detect deception is salient; indirect
questions have been found to discriminate between liars and
truth-tellers even though participants were not informed about
the reason for why they were being assessed (Ulatowska, 2010,
2014). In the current experiment, we chose to measure person
impressions related to warmth because these judgments are more
intuitive compared to other indirect measures (e.g., whether the
target person had to think hard). In contrast to these other indirect
measures, the liking and trustworthiness judgments seemunlikely
to shift attention to specific cues that indicate deception. Instead,
they elicit a more holistic and affective evaluation. Relying on
specific cues could be costly when beliefs about the characteristics
of deceptive behavior are not correct (Forrest et al., 2004). Holistic
judgments, in comparison, have more chance of getting it right if
intuition based on the rich information send by liars indeed aids
deception detection. This is further suggested by studies showing
that task-relevant unconscious thought improves lie detection
(Reinhard et al., 2013). Indeed, our indirect judgments proved
appropriate guides to trustworthiness even when participants
were arguably not searching for cues of deception (i.e., in the not
forewarned phase). We encourage future research to further test
whether these holistic indirect judgments performbetterwhen the
goal to detect deception is present.
Most research on deception detection has explicitly given
participants the instructions to watch a video with the goal of
detecting deception (Reinhard et al., 2013). It seems, however,
that this does not mimic real life situations in which people
are usually not out to spot liars—notwithstanding the notable
exception of law enforcement professionals. Even so, under these
explicit instructions to detect deception, intuitive judgments seem
to outperform deliberative ones (cf. Albrechtsen et al., 2009). Our
experiment, in contrast to other experiments, was characterized
by two distinct phases: One where participants watched videos
while the reason for this was unbeknownst to them, and one
where the goal of watching videos was apparent. This allowed
us to explore differences our physiological measure for these two
phases. While we had suggested that observing a liar would result
in a lower skin temperature than observing a truth-teller, this
was only the case when participants had a clear goal: to detect
deception.
One possible explanation for this could be that while people
generally go through life unsuspicious of others, when they have
the goal to detect “threats” in the environment their conscious as
well as their unconscious reactions are conducted to respond to
this threat more adaptively. One could imagine, for instance, that
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beingmore vigilant heightens conscious processingof information
while at the same time it increases the reflexive, automatic
responses. It has been argued that some automatic processes are
goal-dependent and require awareness of the triggering stimulus
to occur (Bargh, 1994), and that external stimuli and internal
determinants of behavior aremutually dependent on each other in
producing adaptive responses (Fiedler et al., 2009). For instance,
unintentional, spontaneous trait inferences happen with little
awareness, yet they are goal-dependent in the sense that they arise
whenpromptedby a relevant goal (Fiske andTaylor, 2013). It could
be the case that similar processes were unintentionally elicited in
our experiment due to giving participants the explicit instruction
to form impressions of possible deceivers. Future research could
examine this possibility by exploring the relationship between
physiological responses and having, versus not having, a conscious
goal.
When comparing the current results to the results obtained in
the pilot study, the temperature pattern observed in the second
phase of the pilot study seems to resemble the current pattern
observed in the not forewarned phase. Although speculative, a
perceivable cause of this could be that in the pilot study the
forewarningwas notmanipulated as strong as in the current study,
leaving participants still in a relatively ignorant state about what
was to come and whether the experimental context was one of
deception detection. Being able to expect and prepare for what
is to come arguably has some advantages, although it should be
noted that not anticipating threats is comparable to an everyday
life situation in which people assume they will not be lied to.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
In the current study, detection accuracy was slightly higher than
can be expected by chance in forewarned phase, even though
truth-bias was unaltered. This means that participants’ judgments
in the forewarned phase were less often false alarms and more
often hits. This could be due to a learning effect, although this
seems unlikely. Our design was set up to minimize the possibility
of participants getting better over time; participants did not get
feedback on their performance, videos were randomized, and the
procedure of seeing a video and answering questions about it was
“rehearsed” with the nature documentary. We cannot, however,
exclude the possibility that the differences between the two phases
stems from the time participants were on the task, as this feature
is inherent to our within-design. Similarly, we cannot exclude
the possibility that the accuracy of the direct veracity judgment
was assisted by the mere presence of both the indirect veracity
judgments that came before it.
Next to these design characteristics, another possible
explanation for the differences between our experimental
phases could be that simply having thought and read about
lying could make this concept more accessible, unintentionally
influencing inferences and impressions of the target person to
come. An intuition about a person that is based on experiential,
associative knowledge might be triggered by deliberate thought
(cf. Epstein, 2003). A relevant question for future research is
whether activating knowledge structures concerning distrust
would lead to similar enhancement of (indirect) deception
detection as we found here.
In our experiment we found liars to be liked and trusted
less. A possible explanation for this effect of indirect deception
detection is that liars come across more tense and may exhibit
afflicting emotions related to lying, which could lead to emotional
contagion. We did not ask our participants whether they
themselves felt tense after seeing a liar; however, it could be
argued that the temperature measurement is a proxy for this.
Future research will have to identify the exact relationship
between so-called indirect veracity judgments and other
measures indicative of the affective state of the observer.
Although emotional contagion from the liar to the observer
seems plausible, on the basis of what is currently known, it is
too soon to draw any conclusions. Studies where participants
were asked how comfortable they felt after a deceptive message
reveal contradicting patterns (DePaulo and Morris, 2004;
Ulatowska, 2014), possibly due to features of the sender such
as whether their task of lying was cognitively demanding
or the extent to which they themselves feel comfortable
lying. If contagion is indeed present, a possible prediction
could be that the negative feelings elicited in the observer
would aid affective judgments. However, when it comes to
consciously catching the liar these feelings may induce more
systematic processing and therefore hinder direct detection of
veracity.
The fact that our experimental design was able to elicit changes
in temperature is promising, especially in light of the fact that
the use of videos to manipulate truths and lies is a minimal,
albeit controlled, version of real interactions. In general, deception
detection performance is equally poor when observers detect
deception in a live situation compared to observing a video (for
an overview, see: Landström et al., 2005). It is likely, however,
that a target person’s deceptive intent is registered as a threat
to a lesser extend when presented on a video than in a real life
interaction. It is also conceivable that this low level of threat
might need some higher alertness or vigilance to be detected,
as could be the case when being forewarned. Manipulations
that aim to make the environment more unpredictable would
in that case enhance the ability to detect untrustworthiness.
Additionally, people who are constantly more on guard and
distrusting (e.g., insecurely attached individuals) may see more
deception around them. Whether they are more often accurate in
these assessments remains an unanswered question. Furthermore,
it may well be the case that interacting with a liar in real life
is costly and aversive because the observer needs to be more
on the alert. To explore this possibility and to make a broad
generalization possible, more data from accumulating accounts
based on different sets of videos and real life interactions is
needed.
To examine the impact of deceptive messages on the observer
further, more time-sensitive methods would shed light on
the dynamic interplay between interaction partners and its
assumingly adaptive nature. For instance, neural activity
associated with observing a deceptive message could be
considered, as well as mental activity as assessed by pupillary
responses. Other areas of investigation involve the long-term
consequences of insincere interactions on, for instance, judgments
of moral character.
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Conclusion
The current research is a first endeavor to explore
psychophysiological underpinnings of deception detection with
a special focus on thermoregulation within the observer of
truthful and deceptive messages. We found marginal significant
results revealing skin temperature decreased when liars were
observed, whereas temperature trajectories for observing
truth-tellers were dependent on being forewarned of the
possibility of deceit. Indirect judgments of liars and truth-
tellers revealed that lying typically caused a person to be
liked and trusted less, while accuracy on a direct judgment
of whether this person was lying was barely above chance
level.
Pre-Registration
The aim of this registered experiment was to investigate a
previously unexplored part of deceptive social interactions and
the role of psychophysiology (i.e., the embodiment) of these
interactions on the part of the receiving end of a deceptive
message. This research, fundamental in its nature, is but
an example of the multitude of opportunities for further
investigation—some of which we have suggested above. The
fact that this research was pre-registered played a positive role
in the development of our experiment and it did not constrain
our curiosity for exploring the data. Working together with
reviewers in an early stage maximizes chances of making a
valuable contribution to current debates. In addition, this process
and its open access character carry on the momentum, enabling
researchers to continuously build on ongoing work. We hope to
have inspired future investigations of the interaction between
physiology and cognition, and the possible influences of this
interaction for social relationships.
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